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ABSTRACT

Title of Dissertation:

The Potential Impact of the ISM Code on Shipowner’s
Liability for Maritime Claims.

Degree:

MSc

This dissertation is concerned primarily with the legal and insurance implications of
the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution
Prevention -- International Safety Management Code (ISM Code). It focuses on the
potential impact on the shipowner’s liability for maritime claims, i.e. the civil
liability and criminal liability of shipowners and their liability in marine insurance.
The ISM Code, as a mandatory regulation, lays down an internationally accepted
standard on shipowner’s responsibility for safe management of ships and pollution
prevention. The shipowner has to establish, maintain and implement a Safety
Management System (SMS) which meets the requirements of the ISM Code.
The impact on civil liability aspects will be more focused on the impact on
shipowner’s liability for cargo loss or damage and shipowner’s legal right to limit his
liability for claims. Questions such as seaworthiness, crew’s negligence, actual fault
and privity, recklessness with knowledge and the role of the designated person(s) will
be discussed.
A breach of the ISM Code and non-conformities of the SMS will be regarded as
management failure, which may lead to criminal prosecution for “manslaughter” and
“corporate killing”.
Hull and Machinery (H & M) underwriters and Protection and Indemnity (P & I)
Clubs have already changed the conditions in policies to meet the requirements of the
ISM Code. Shipowners’ liability for keeping their ships in seaworthy condition and
their duty of disclosure will be tested by the ISM Code.
The ISM Code can be used by the shipowner as proof of best practice compliance.
But in this dissertation, the greater emphasis will be placed upon the potential
consequences of non-compliance with the requirements of the ISM Code, as this is
the main area of concern.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention, i.e. the International Safety Management Code (ISM Code)
was adopted in November 1993 by the Assembly of the International Maritime
Organisation (IMO) as Resolution A. 741 (18). It was the culmination of a series of
resolutions adopted by IMO, such as Resolution A. 680 (17), Resolution A. 596 (15),
Resolution A. 411 (XI) and Resolution A. 443 (XI), which are dealing with
guidelines on management procedures to ensure the safest possible operation of ships
and maximum attainable prevention of marine pollution.

There had been a series of maritime disasters, which exploded in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. The following are some of them:
•

1987

Ro/Ro ferry Herald of Free Enterprise capsized off Zeebrugge. About
188 passengers and crew died.

•

1987

Ferry Dona Paz collided with a tanker in the Philippines. Estimated
4,386 people killed.

•

1989

Tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground off the coast of Alaska. 37,000 tonnes
of oil spilled and extensive environmental damage caused. Final claims
level possibly exceeding USD 10 billion.
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•

1990

Ferry Scandinavian Star fire. 158 people died.

•

1991

Tanker Agip Abruzzo collided with Ro/Ro ferry Moby Prince off
Livorno, Italy. Fire, pollution and 143 people died.

•

1991

Haven fire and explosion off Genoa. Claims in excess of USD 700
million.

•

1991

Ferry Salem Express struck reef and sunk. 470 people killed.

•

1992

Aegean Sea broke in two off La Coruna, Spain. Extensive pollution.
Claims approaching USD 200 million.

•

1993

Braer driven onto Shetland Islands. Pollution claims in region of USD
200 million.

•

1994

Ro/Ro passenger ferry Estonia sank after bow door fell off during heavy
weather at sea. More than 800 people died.

•

1996

Sea Empress major oil pollution off Milford Haven, UK.

These maritime disasters caused extensive loss of life and serious damage to the
marine environment. They also caused serious economic losses to the shipping
industry. During the period 1987 to 1990, P & I insurance claims, and consequently
the cost of P & I insurance, rose on average by more than 200 per cent. There were
similar development to the Hull and Machinery claims and premium (Anderson,
1998, 14).

The public, the industry, government agencies and international

organisations have paid more attention to these accidents. Researches have been
done by the government agencies and by industry to try to find out what might be
behind this problem.

A common factor which appeared in almost all the reports of investigations is that
basically these accidents and incidents primarily arose as a result of human failings.
In the “Human Element in Shipping Casualties”, the report of the research funded by
the UK Department of Transport in 1988, it was stated that the human element was
found to be causative in over 90 per cent of collisions and groundings and over 75
per cent of contacts and fires/explosions. The UK P & I Club reported that human
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error accounted for 58 per cent of all claims. In 1992 the UK House of Lords Select
Committee on Science and Technology issued its report on the “Safety Aspects of
Ship Design and Technology”. The report concluded that four out of five (80%) ship
casualties are due to human error (Anderson, 1998, 15).

The ISM Code was produced following these high profile incidents and in response
to political pressure. It is a relatively short document which is only 13 articles long.
However, it is the first step taken by IMO to minimise human error and management
deficiencies as causative factors in maritime casualties.

Considering the fact that human error has been proved to be the greatest contributor
to marine accidents and many of them can ultimately be traced to management, the
ISM Code is concentrated on improving the software of shipping, i.e. to raise
management standards and practices for safe management ships and pollution
prevention, rather than laying down specific rules as to the technical condition of the
ship. It specifically targets the human element and the philosophy behind regulating
that element.

It demands that companies formalise structures and management

systems for safety and implement these through specific routines, defined roles and
crew training.

The ISM Code establishes safety management objectives, which are:
• to provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
• to establish safeguards against all identified risks;
• to continuously improve safety management skills of personnel, including
preparing for emergencies.
It requires the Company, which is defined as the owner of the ship, or any other
organisation or person such as the manager, or the bare boat charterer, who has
assumed the responsibility for operation of the ship from the shipowner and who, on
assuming such responsibility, has agreed to take over all duties and responsibility
imposed by the ISM code, to establish a safety management system (SMS). This
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system should be designed to ensure compliance with all mandatory regulations and
codes, guidelines and standards recommended by IMO and other organisations.

The ISM Code was prepared as a self-contained document. However, it has been
incorporated into the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
1974 as chapter IX entitled Management for the Safe Operation of Ships in 1994.

The incorporation of the ISM Code into SOLAS 74 made it mandatory in states that
are parties to the SOLAS Convention. Under the Convention’s tacit acceptance
procedures, it will apply by default and is not dependant upon any active adoption
measure. As a consequence, those states which gave effect to the amended SOLAS
Convention will now have to ensure that appropriate rules giving effect to the ISM
Code are introduced into their own domestic legislation and implemented at the
following date:
•

Not later than 1st July, 1998 for all passenger ships, including high-speed
passenger craft; oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and
cargo high speed craft of 500 grt and above.

•

Not later than 1st July, 2002 for all other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling
units of 500 grt and above.

The ISM Code establishes an internationally recognised standard for the organisation
of a shipping company’s management in relation to safety and pollution prevention.
It is not directly concerned with the civil and criminal liability of the shipowner for
maritime claims and the shipowner’s insurance cover. However, considering that
most of the casualties in shipping and marine pollution incidents are the result of
crew negligence, ineffective management and lack of communications between the
vessel and the shore based managers, the ISM Code will impact upon all shipowners
because the court is likely to treat it as the yardstick of liability in every situation
where managerial standards and faults have to be examined. The contents of the
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ISM Code will constitute guidance to the judges as to what constitutes “best
practice” in ship management and operation.

In this dissertation, shipowner’s responsibility under the ISM Code will be described
in Chapter 2. These responsibilities include establishing safety and environment
protection policy, defining levels of authority and lines of communication between
and amongst shore and shipboard personnel, setting procedures for reports and
analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences, setting
procedures for responding to emergencies and setting procedures for internal audits
and management review.

One of the important topics discussed in the dissertation is the impact of the ISM
Code on the shipowner’s civil liability. First, the question of seaworthiness, or rather
unseaworthiness, of the ship will be discussed: how the court traditionally considered
unseaworthiness, the way the ISM Code affects the shipowner’s liability on
exercising due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and the effect of the noncompliance with the requirements of the ISM Code on shipowner’s liability.
Secondly, I will discuss the effect of the ISM Code on shipowners’ legal right to
limit their financial liability, which include how the implementation of the ISM Code
will affect the judgement of the shipowner’s conduct under the “fault and privity”
and “recklessness with intent” regimes, the role of the designated person(s) and what
the possible implication of the status of the designated person(s) will have on the
assumed state of knowledge of the shipowner or the alter ego of the company.
Thirdly, some other aspects of the civil liability of the shipowner will also be
discussed in Chapter 3.

Also in the dissertation, the impact of the ISM Code on a shipowner’s criminal
liability will be discussed in Chapter 4. Because the criminal law approaches are
quite different in different countries, the United Kingdom has been used as an
example to see how the ISM Code affects the shipowner’s criminal liability under the
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current English Law (Sections 98 and 100 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995) as
well as the future law, i.e., Clause 4 of the Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill.

The impact of the ISM Code on a shipowner’s insurance cover will be examined in
Chapter 5. Hull and Machinery (H & M) underwriters and Protection and Indemnity
(P & I) Clubs have already changed the conditions in policies to meet the
requirement of the ISM Code. Does the ISM Code put more liability on the shoulder
of shipowners for their insurance cover?

There have been many articles talking about the potential impact of the ISM Code on
shipowner’s liability. The years ahead of us will certainly see many legal and
insurance cases being argued before the courts and arbitrators, exploring the finer
details and applying an interpretation on the ISM Code. However, up to now, there
is no court decision on this subject. The influence of the ISM Code is still unclear.
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Chapter 2
The Ship Owner’s Statutory Responsibility Under the ISM Code

The basic requirement of the International Safety management (ISM) Code is that the
shipowner or any other organisation or person who has assumed the responsibility
for operation of the ship, i.e. the “Company” which is defined in the ISM Code,
should develop, implement and maintain a Safety Management System (SMS).

The system should comply with mandatory rules and regulations and take into
account the applicable code, guidelines and standards recommended by the IMO,
flag state administrations, classification societies and maritime industry organisations
to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life, and avoidance of
damage to the environment and to property.

With the implementation of the SMS, the Company can provide for safe practices in
ship operation and a safe working environment, establish safeguards against all
identified risks and continuously improve safety-management skills of personnel
ashore and aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies related to safety and
environmental protection.

The SMS is a structured and documented system enabling the Company’s personnel
to effectively implement the Company’s safety and environment protection policy
(IMO, 1995). As a system, it must be concerned with all safety and environment
protection activities and tasks, both ashore and on board. All the activities and tasks
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are planned, organised, executed and checked by the system in accordance with the
legislative and the Company’s requirements.

It is important to understand that the SMS is not just a documented system, it is
concerned with the organisational structure of the Company, the responsibilities and
authority of the different departments and persons involved in the system, the lines of
communication between these departments and persons and the management
processes and procedures. It is also concerned with the necessary resources to
manage the tasks and activities related to safety and environment protection, such as
people, financial support, equipment, materials, technology and software.

The

system must “enable the company to measure its performance, allowing areas for
improvement to be identified and implemented” (ICS and ISF, 1996, 6).

2.1

Safety and environment protection policy

The establishment of the safety and environment protection policy is the first step for
establishing the SMS. The Company should ensure the policy is implemented and
maintained at all levels of the organisation, both ship based as well as shore based.
“The policy should be a concise and clear statement. It should describe the aim of
the SMS and outline a strategy and plan of action to achieve and maintain the aim”
(ICS and ISF, 1996, 15).

2.2

Responsibilities and authorities

The development of a safety culture is not merely the matter of having a safety and
environment protection policy, but also the systematic practice within the
organisation from top management ashore down to the officers and crew at sea.
Everybody involved in the management of safety and environment protection has
his/her responsibilities in the safety and environment protection task.
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The ISM Code describes the Company’s responsibilities and authorities in Article 3.
First, it is the question of which organisation will be responsible for the safety and
environment protection. Generally, the entity which in responsible for the operation
of the ship is also responsible for safety and environment protection. But “if the
entity who is responsible for the operation of the ship is other than the owner, the
owner must report the full name and details of such entity to the Administration”
(Art. 3.1, the ISM Code).

Secondly, the Company should clearly define the responsibility and authority of
personnel concerned with safety and pollution prevention. The documenting of the
responsibility and authority of personnel is to ensure those who are involved in the
management of safety and environmental protection know what is expected of them
to make the system function effectively. In the meantime, it can assist in motivating
them to understand the vital importance of their performance in the success of the
Safety Management System.

Thirdly, a person or persons should be designated to provide a link between ship and
shore to monitor the operation of each ship. Adequate resources and support should
be provided to the designated person(s).

Besides Article 3, the requirements of the ISM Code for the company’s
responsibilities can be seen in every part of the ISM Code. Throughout the ISM
Code, we can find repetitious phraseology talking about the responsibilities of the
Company, such as “The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of
plans and instructions for key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship
and protection of pollution.

The various tasks involved should be defined and

assigned qualified personnel” (Article 7, the ISM Code) and “The Company should
establish procedures to identify, describe and respond to potential emergency
shipboard situation” (Article 8, the ISM Code) and “The Company should establish
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and maintain procedures to control all documents and data which are relevant to
SMS (Article 11, the ISM Code).

2.3

Resources and personnel

Nowadays, the maritime industry has become particularly concerned with the subject
of the “human element”. The introduction of the ISM Code seeks to set operational
procedures to improve safety and environment protection, but it is important to
ensure the people involved in carrying out the procedures are adequate (Mottram,
1998).

The whole content of Article 6 of the ISM Code is concerned with the qualification
and training requirement of the people involved in safety and environment
protection, both on shore and at sea. In the meantime, a Company should ensure that
staff and crew are properly informed and equipped to fulfil their operational
responsibilities safely.

The master is a very important person within the SMS. Holding an appropriate
international recognised certificate is not enough for the master.

To be fully

conversant with the Company’s Safety Management System, he must also have some
ability and special skill in command and control.

The crew members working on board the ship must be qualified, certificated and
medically fit seafarers. All personnel concerned with safety and pollution prevention
should be familiar with their SMS related duties and adequately understand the
relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines.

This is very important for

maintaining the continuity and effective performance level of the SMS.

Considering the fact that more and more ships are manned by crews from different
countries with different home languages, the effective communication between crew
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members in the execution of their duties related to the SMS is very important. The
Company should ensure the ship’s personnel have received relevant information on
the SMS in a working language or language understood by them. However, it is
necessary to carry out training which may be required in support of the SMS for all
personnel concerned.

2.4

The designated person(s) and the master

The master and the designated person(s) have special status within the Safety
Management System. They have very important responsibilities in the Company’s
safety and environment protection.

2.4.1

The designated person(s)

As stated in the ISM Code, a person or persons ashore having direct access to the
highest level of management should be designated by every appropriate Company to
ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the Company
and those on board (Article 4, ISM Code).

The designated person(s) is a new concept in the maritime field although it is similar
to the Management Representative, a person responsible for the quality system, that
is required by the ISO 9002 element 4.1.2.3. In most shipping companies which have
also opted for ISO Certification, these two requirements may be merged into the
appointment of the same person (Paranjpe, 1996).

The role of the designated person(s) is to monitor safety and pollution prevention
aspects of the operation of each ship and to ensure adequate resources and shorebased support are applied. He must also put in place a system of verification, review
and evaluation (Expert views, 1998).
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Apart from the responsibilities clearly stated in Article 4 of the ISM Code, the
designated person(s) should generally:
•

Be suitably qualified and experienced in safety and pollution control aspects of
ship operation (meaning a master of chief engineer);

•

Be fully conversant with the Company’s safety and environment policy;

•

Have the independence and authority to report deficiencies to the highest level of
management;

•

Be responsible for safety audits;

•

Ensure corrective action is taken (Paranjpe, 1996).

As is clearly mentioned in Article 4 of the ISM Code, the designated person(s)
ashore should have direct access to the highest level of management. That means the
designated person(s) may not be a person in the highest level of management.
According to the article “ISM Truths, Myths and Grey Areas: A synthesis of the
ISMA panel of experts” (1998), “the designated person(s) should not be someone
directly involved in the management of the vessel”. So the designated person(s) may
not be a ship owner or a person who can represent the ship owner. However because
of the special status of the designated person(s), he should provide a link between the
Company and the ship. He has the independence and authority to report deficiencies
to the highest level of management. As the ICS/ISF in their Guidelines suggested,
the designated person(s) also has the responsibility to ensure corrective action is
taken. The introduction of the designated person(s) may become a very sensitive
area in the implementation of the ISM Code and maritime law field.

The knowledge, experience and records of the designated person(s) are very
important to the Company. It is clear that activities and records of the designated
person(s) and the performance of the SMS may be crucial for the shipowner in
establishing or refuting maritime claims. These matters will be discussed in the
following chapters.
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2.4.2 The master

The master is the highest level commander on board the ship.

He takes full

responsibility for the safe operation of the ship and pollution prevention on board.
According to the ISM Code, the Company must “clearly define and document” the
master’s responsibility, as specified in Article 5.1, including reporting deficiencies in
the SMS to the shore based management (Rudd, 1996).

There are general responsibilities and authorities for all personnel, which includes
the master of the ship, in Article 3 of the ISM Code. It states that the Company
should define and document the responsibility, authority and interrelation of all
personnel who manage, perform and verify work relating to and affecting safety and
pollution prevention. In Article 5, the responsibility and authority of the master are
particularly focused on the operation of the SMS.

The ship is seen as a special independent unit in the SMS. The implementation of
the SMS on board can not be fully monitored by the designated person(s) on shore.
The master is the person responsible for the implementation of the SMS on board.
At the same time, he is also the person to monitor the performance of the SMS on
board, which is similar to the designated person(s) on shore (COSCO Shanghai,
1997, 66). That is why a company has to ensure the master is “fully conversant with
the Company’s SMS” (Article 6.1.2, the ISM Code).

Considering the uncertainty of the sea’s condition, the ISM Code gives the master
“overriding authority and responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and
pollution prevention” (Article 5.2, the ISM Code). The ship’s master has complete
authority and responsibility for taking all necessary actions for safety, pollution
prevention and the efficient operation of his ship. “In certain situations this may
mean deviation from documented procedures” (Lloyd’s Register, 1996). This means
the master can take whatever action he considers to be in the best interests of
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passengers, crew, the ship and the marine environment. It gives the master full
authority to take action according to the actual conditions and his experience, even if
these actions deviate from the Company’s documented procedures.

2.5

Maintenance of the ship and equipment

Article 10 of the ISM Code contains the requirement for safe, efficient and effective
maintenance of the ship and equipment.

First, the company should establish procedures to ensure the ship is maintained,
repaired and surveyed in conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules,
regulations and additional requirements established by the Company.

Second, in order to meet these requirements, it is necessary to establish and
implement procedures, including the requirement for inspections, reporting nonconformities, analysis, corrective actions and records. The procedures should be
implemented in the daily maintenance operations.

Third, the company should establish procedures in the SMS to identify equipment
and technical systems which may result in hazardous situations in case of sudden
operational failure. The SMS should provide for specific measures in order to
promote the reliability of the equipment or system.

All these procedures and

measures should be implemented in the daily maintenance operation.

Article 10.2 requires the person who is responsible for operation of the vessel and
safety and environment protection to report any non-conformity and its possible
cause. Non-conformity here refers to the non-conformity of ship and equipment
which is discovered during the daily maintenance operation. These non-conformities
will affect the seaworthiness of the ship and equipment (COSCO Shanghai, 1997,
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77-78). The company should ensure that appropriate corrective action is taken and
records of these activities are maintained.

2.6

Reports and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous

occurrences

According to Article 9 of the ISM Code, the SMS should include procedures
ensuring that the master should report the following to the designated person(s):
•

Accidents,

•

Hazardous occurrences,

•

Non-conformities within the SMS and

•

Suggested modifications and improvements to the SMS (ICS and ISF, 1996, 24).

The report will be reviewed and evaluated by the appropriate level of management to
determine corrective action and ensure that recurrences are avoided.

The reports of accidents and hazardous occurrences should include the probable
causes, details of the consequences with respect to harm to people, damage to the
environment or property, or the loss of operational safety, and any suggestions for
improvement (ICS and ISF, 1996, 24).

The non-conformity here refers to any deviation from the SMS procedures and
instructions. It is a non-conformity in management aspect which focuses on safety
and environment protection conditions of the Company and the ship as a whole. This
is different from the non-conformity of the technical condition of the ship and
equipment which is described in Article 10.2.2. Not only should the master report
the non-conformities within the daily management but also the designated person(s),
who is in charge of the safety and environment protection of the company, should
report all the non-conformities within the SMS to the highest level of management.
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The Company should introduce a system for recording, investigating, evaluating,
reviewing and analysing the reports. As a result, corrective actions should be taken,
experiences should be distributed throughout the Company and the existing SMS
procedures and instructions should be amended if necessary.

2.7

Internal audits, external verification and certification

The ISM Code also requires the Company to carry out internal audits for verifying
whether safety and pollution prevention activities comply with the SMS.

This

internal audit should be carried out by independent personnel and follow documented
procedures. If deficiencies are found, possible corrective action should be carried
out by the management personnel responsible for the area involved.

These

deficiencies also include those related to the Company’s SMS itself, e.g. organisation
structure, personnel, responsibilities and authorities and the Company’s safety
management regulations (COSCO, Shanghai, 1997, 92-93).

The external verification should be carried out by the Administration (the
Government of the flag state) or an organisation recognised by the Administration or
by the Government of the country, acting on behalf of the Administration in which
the Company has chosen to conduct its business. If the Company has been proved
by the verification that it has complied with the requirements of the ISM Code, a
Document of Compliance (DOC) should be issued.

After the Administration or organisations recognised by the Administration verified
that the Company and its shipboard management are operating in accordance with
the approved SMS, a Safety Management Certificate (SMC) should be issued to a
ship.
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The SMC and a copy of DOC should be carried on board the ship in order that the
master may produce it for the verification the Administration or organisation
recognised by the Administration.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of the ISM Code on Ship Owner’s Civil Liability

3.1

The impact on shipowner’s liability for loss of or damage to cargoes

The carrier’s liability in respect of cargo is very often determined according to the
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules. Although the International Safety Management (ISM)
Code is not directly concerned with issues of carriage of goods by sea, it will affect
the way in which a carrier’s liability is assessed in the event of loss of or damage to
cargo. “Safety and seaworthiness go hand in hand” (Intertanko, 1996, 33).

3.1.1

The Hague and Hague-Visby Rules

The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of
Lading (Hague Rules) was adopted in 1924 and was amended by the 1968 Brussels
Protocol of amendments and the Protocol of 1979 . The amended Convention is
known as the Hague-Visby Rules. The Hague-Visby Rules have been ratified by
most of the important maritime countries. This has resulted in virtual uniformity in
the regulation of the most important legal disputes involving Bills of Lading,
including what a Bill of Lading should contain and what liability is associated with
the description of the cargo (IMO, 1993, 77).

Most of maritime countries have ratified or accessed the Hague Rules or HagueVisby Rules. The principles of the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules have been
incorporated into the national legislation by various ways in these countries.
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Although some countries have not ratified the Hague Rules or Hague-Visby Rules,
their legislation are largely based on them.

The Hague Rules are given effect in the U.S. by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 46
U.S.C. The Hague-Visby Rules are given effect under English law by the Carriage
of Goods by Sea Act 1971 (Intertanko, 1996, 33), and the Maritime Code of the
People’s Republic of China, 1992 also contains similar provisions to the ones shown
above.

According to the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier is the party “who enters into a
contract of carriage with the shipper” (Richardson, 1998, 15), including the owner or
the charterer. But in most cases, the carrier for the purposes of the Hague-Visby
Rules is the shipowning company, although it is possible for the carrier to be a
demise charterer or time charterer (Heward, 1996). This definition is similar to the
“Company” as defined by the ISM Code. But the “carrier” does not include the
manager.

3.1.2

The impact of the ISM Code

The impact of the ISM Code on the shipowner’s liability under the Hague-Visby
Rules lies in the effect that the Code will have upon the interplay between the
“overriding obligation” in Article III (1) and the “crew negligence” exception in
Article IV (2) (Heward, 1996).

3.1.2.1 Due diligence

The fundamental obligation of the carrier (shipowner or charterer) under the HagueVisby Rules is to exercise due diligence to keep the ship seaworthy and properly
manned, equipped and supplied the ship. This responsibility comes into sharp focus
with the implementation of the ISM Code.
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Due diligence can be defined as “a genuine, competent and reasonable effort of the
shipowner to fulfil the obligation to provide a seaworthy vessel” (Ogg, 1996).
Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading (19th Edition) comments that “the due
diligence required is due diligence in the work itself by the carrier, all persons,
whether servants or agents or independent contractors whom he employs or engages
in the task of making the ship seaworthy; the carrier does not, therefore, discharge
the burden of proving that due diligence has been exercised by proof that he engaged
competent persons to perform and supervise the task of making the ship seaworthy”
(Mocatta, et al, 1984, 434).

Due diligence can also be defined as “not merely a praiseworthy or sincere, though
unsuccessful, effort, but such an intelligent and efficient attempt as shall make it so
(seaworthy) as far as diligence can serve” (Richardson, 1998, 20). So just saying “I
did my best” is not enough. The carrier’s actions in exercising due diligence will be
judged against the standard at the highest level. This standard will change with the
change of knowledge, technology, method of operation and other factors
(Richardson, 1998, 20). For example, a shipowner may successfully defend himself
for the unexpected failure of a component which may not be reasonably expected to
fail. But next time when a similar situation happens to the same shipowner, the
standard of care will have risen. The shipowner can not defend himself by saying
that he did not know the situation might happen.

The introduction of the ISM Code sets a new standard for “due diligence”. The
shipowner’s Safety Management System (SMS) will be tested. Generally, the due
diligence of a shipowner will be judged with a two stage test: first, the content of his
SMS will be evaluated to ascertain whether it was a system capable of ensuring
safety and marine environment protection; second, the application of the SMS will be
judged as well as actions of the shipowner to ensure its application (Pamborides,
1996). The failure to implement the Code or failure in any one of the particular
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requirements, e.g. failure to take action to correct a defect which was identified by
the internal audit, will be used as evidence for the claimant to claim the lack of due
diligence of the shipowner.

3.1.2.2 Seaworthiness and proper manning

As we discussed before, under the Hague-Visby Rules, the shipowner’s liability is to
exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. To be seaworthy, a vessel “must
have that degree of fitness which an ordinary, careful and prudent owner would
require his vessel to have at the commencement of her voyage, having regard to all
the probable circumstances of it” (Gaskell, et al, 1997, 187). The shipowner must
keep his vessel fit in design, structure, condition and equipment (the physical
condition of the ship and the condition of the cargo holds/tanks) to encounter the
ordinary perils of the voyage and have a competent master and competent and
efficient crew to meet the requirements of the Hague-Visby Rules.

The question will be asked when a cargo claim arises that whether the ship was
seaworthy and whether the carrier failed to take care of the goods. The ISM Code
will have an impact on these issues. Firstly, the objective standard of seaworthiness
will now be tested against requirements of the Code and Chapter IX of SOLAS.
Secondly, if there is a satisfactory SMS existing, but the shipowner or operator has
failed to implement it, then either the ship is unseaworthy because the SMS is not in
fact being implemented properly (in breach Article III-1) or the shipowner has failed
to properly care for the cargo (in breach of Article III-2) (International Safety
Management Code, part II, 1998).

The ISM Code, as stated in the preamble of the Code, is an “international standard
for the safe management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention”. It is a
prevailing standard for safe management which has been widely accepted by the
shipping industry.
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Non-conformity, which is a deviation from the requirement specified in the
shipowner’s SMS, will be regarded as unseaworthiness in many cases. For example,
Article 10 of the ISM Code deals with the maintenance of the ship and its equipment.
A planned preventative maintenance system is acceptable under the ISM Code. The
maintenance work should be organised and carried out with forethought, control and
records. If the maintenance routines and schedules are not set ahead after proper
consideration of what might happen, this will be regarded as unseaworthiness.
Furthermore, if the shipowner has established a planned maintenance system which
complies with the ISM Code only for getting the ship to pass the assessment, but the
system has not been implemented properly, the ship may also be regarded as
unseaworthy (Ogg, 1995).

Unseaworthiness is not only limited to the ship being unfit to face the perils of the
voyage on account of physical deficiency but also includes an undermanned or
poorly manned ship, i.e. simply a badly managed ship (Grime, 1995).

Historically, when people talked about “properly manning” the ship, they were
talking about whether the crew member was properly certified, whether his
employment record tended to show that he was competent and whether the
shipowner had exercised reasonable care in selecting the crew member. The phrase
“properly manned ship” has been summarised in Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills
of Lading (19th Edition) (Mocatta, et al, 1984, 435) as follows:

“The shipowner must satisfy himself by inspection of the seaman’s
documents, interviews and inquiries from previous employers that he is
reasonably fit to occupy the post to which he is appointed. It will not
necessarily be enough to rely on certificates of competence held by the
seaman.”
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With the introduction of the ISM Code, it is not enough for the shipowner to select
certified and well recorded crew members and put them on board the ship. “To
ensure each ship is manned with qualified, certified and medically fit seafarers” is
just a part of the shipowner’s obligations, which are set out in Article 6 of the ISM
Code. The ISM Code goes on to lay down further requirements. The shipowner has
to ensure that each member of a ship’s crew is competent to carry out his duties and
the whole crew must perform as a team. Competence now includes the training of
each crew member in the provisions of the SMS of the Company as well as his
familiarisation with the instructions, which must be provided prior to sailing, by the
Company to each crew member. This information must be provided in a language
which can be understood by the crew member. The crew members must be able to
effectively communicate with each other.

The shipowner also has the responsibility to provide the crew members with all of
the necessary information and instructions about how to handle hazardous situations
as well as the steps and measures that must be taken in order to prevent problems
arising. In the case of an emergency situation, the crew must follow the related
procedures which are described in the SMS. However there remains a problem. If
the crew members do as the procedures say but the efforts fail, it may be shown that
the Company failed to establish the right procedure for the particular emergency. On
the other hand, if the crew members do not follow the established procedure of the
Company and there are damages or loss of cargo as a result of this, then there might
be liability for the carrier either because it failed to train the crew members according
to the SMS or because it failed to motivate them in following the policy
(Pamborides, 1996).

Article 5.2 of the ISM Code says that the master has the “overriding authority and
responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention”. It
gives the master full authority to take action according to the actual condition and his
experience, even if these actions deviate from the Company’s documented
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procedures. But if his action has failed, the shipowner has to prove the loss or
damage was caused by crew negligence in order to seek exemption from liability.

3.1.2.3 Exemption from liability by crew negligence

Under the Hague-Visby Rules, the shipowner can exempt himself from liability for
loss or damage arising or resulting from the act, neglect, or default of the master,
mariner, pilot or the servants of the carrier in the navigation or in the management of
the ship. When a loss appears to have been caused by crew negligence, if the
shipowner can prove that crew members were properly certified, their employment
records suggest they were competent (at least not incompetent) and that the
shipowner has exercised reasonable care in select the crew members, there was
previously little incentive to challenge the “crew negligence” defence because there
was no evidence to show that the vessel was not “properly manned” for the propose
of Article III (b) of the Hague-Visby Rules. But with the introduction of the ISM
Code, the shipowner may find it is not so easy to defend himself under “crew
negligence”.

The ISM Code is likely to have the effect of reducing the proportion of cases in
which crew negligence will be regarded as the sole cause of a loss (Potential legal
implication of ISM Code, 1996). Under the Hague-Visby Rules, the shipowner has
the obligation to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy and properly
manned, equipped and supplied. The ISM Code, as a new safety management
standard, gives an explanation of the “proper manning” in Article 6.1—“ to ensure
that each ship is manned with qualified, certificated and medically fit seafarers...”.
It also gives further requirements in the following Articles 6.2 to 6.7. So if there is a
cargo claim involving a crew error, the shipowner may have to show that he has
exercised due diligence to comply with all the duties required by the ISM Code in the
selection and training of the crew. “An error by a crew member will be regarded as
having been brought about, wholly or in part, by a lack of an adequate system and/or
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training aboard the ship.” (Heward, 1996). If the shipowner has not exercised due
diligence to man the ship properly according to the ISM Code and this fault is the
reason for the loss or damage to the cargo, the “crew negligence” defence will be
irrelevant.

3.1.2.4 Questions of evidence

The other effect of the ISM Code is that it will be easy for the claimant to get enough
documented evidence to establish whether or not the owner is in breach of his duty of
care.

According to the Hague-Visby Rules, the carrier or other person who is claiming
exemption, has the responsibility for the burden of proving “due diligence” whenever
loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness.

The ISM Code requires the shipowner to produce a lot of written materials such as
documents, procedures, reports within the SMS. From these materials, the claimant
may find what system was in place and whether the system was properly operated.
This applies not only to pre-existing documents relating to the state of the vessel and
the internal audit reports but also potentially to subsequent investigation reports
relating to the incident itself. If the investigation shows non-conformance, which
was documented in the audit report but no corrective action was taken, the claimant
may easily prove that due diligence was not exercised by the shipowner to make the
ship seaworthy (Paranjpe, 1997). On the other hand, if the SMS documents are
asked for and not provided, this may also prejudice the shipowner.

Sometimes the document of SMS itself will become evidence against the shipowner.
As the example given by Captain Ogg (1995) in his article:
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“A very large state-of-the-art container vessel operated by a rated,
professional carrier lost or damaged 50 boxes off the fore deck in bad
weather in the Mediterranean. In defence to a claim brought by cargo
interests, the carrier invoked perils of the sea, alleging not one but two
successive freak waves.

Cargo counter-alleged that the cause or a cause of the damage was the
failure of the vessel’s master to slow down in admittedly bad weather
conditions in order to protest the deck cargo which was vulnerable to loss
and damage. Cargo said this was evidenced by among other things, the
master’s note of protect which started off by referring to the need to
average over 22 knots on the voyage in order to make his scheduled
ETA.

The carrier denied cargo’s allegation, referring to a policy

statement contained in its deck officer’s manual: ‘We stress that the
safety of the crew and the ship is the first and most important
requirement, while quick dispatch is secondary”.

The carrier gave quick dispatch a higher priority than care of the cargo, which is not
even mentioned in the statement. Of course this evidence can do nothing to support
the defendant. On the other hand, it may be used as evidence by the plaintiff against
the carrier.

3.1.3

Conclusion

The ISM Code lays down standards for assessing the due diligence, seaworthiness
and safe operation of the ship. The shipowner will have to bear the consequent
liability if he fails to live up to these standards and fails to comply with his SMS at
the time of the incident. In the meantime, a great deal of paper circulating within the
owner’s office and on board will give the claimant greater scope for establishing
precisely what has gone wrong.
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Nevertheless, if the ship has a well designed and approved SMS, holds all the
required documents and certificates and can establish that the master and crew
members were properly trained etc., it will be easy for the shipowner to argue that a
claim against him did not arise as a result of unseaworthiness and/or that it occurred
as a result of an individual act of neglect by the master in the navigation or
management of the ship, for which he would not be responsible under the HagueVisby Rules (International Safety Management Code, Part II, 1998).

3.2

The impact on limitation of shipowner’s liability

Legal limitation of the liability of shipowners for loss or damage resulting from
negligent navigation or management of the ship has long traditions in international
maritime law. Although legal regimes are different in different countries, there are
two commonly accepted principles. Firstly, the legal limit of liability varies with the
size of the ship. Secondly, the shipowner will not be entitled to limit his liability if
the loss or damage resulted from his personal fault or neglect (Selvig, 1984).

3.2.1

The legal framework of limitation of liability

3.2.1.1 Related international conventions

There are two types of limitation provisions: the global limitation and the specific or
contractual limitation.

The specific or contractual limitation applies to special claims. It includes provisions
in various international conventions covering carriage of goods and passengers by
sea, e.g. the Hague Rules, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and the
Athens Convention.

Other individual regimes established by international
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conventions with respect to oil pollution, nuclear liability and hazardous and noxious
substances accidents are also under this special heading (Vlasto, 1998).

The global limitation relates to claims from all and any accidents. Generally it is
applied after any applicable specific limitation provision.

3.2.1.1.1 The global limitation

There are two international conventions dealing with the global limitation. They are
the International Convention Relating to the Limitation of the Liability of Owners of
Sea-going Ships 1957 (the 1957 Convention) and the Convention on Limitation of
Liability for Maritime Claims, 1976 (the LLMC 1976 Convention).

The 1957 Convention was adopted in Brussels in 1957. This convention has been
ratified or acceded to by a considerable number of states.

According to Article 1 (1) of the 1957 Convention, the person entitled to limit his
liability is the owner of a seagoing ship. This right has been widened by Article 1 (3)
to include ownership, possession, custody or control of the ship in order to protect
charterers, shipbuilders and repair yards. The master and members of crew are
entitled to limit their liability even if the damage was caused by their own negligent
acts. Furthermore, the mortgagee is also able to limit his liability for damage caused
after taking possession of the ship (Donner, 1996).

The shipowner is not always entitled to limit his liability. He will lose the right to
limit if the loss or damage resulted from “the actual fault or privity of the owner”
(Article 1 (1), the 1957 Convention).

Although the 1957 Convention has gradually been superseded by the LLMC 1976
Convention, it is still in force in over 40 jurisdictions (Grime, 1996).
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The LLMC 1976 Convention was adopted in London and came into force in 1986. It
provides a quite modern and satisfactory general system of limitation of liability
which covers about 43.12 % of the world tonnage (IMO, 1999).

In the LLMC 1976 Convention, it is declared that “shipowners and salvors, as
hereinafter defined, may limit their liability, in accordance with the rules of this
Convention for claims set out in Article 2” (Article 1 (1), the LLMC 1976
Convention).

The shipowner here means “the owner, charterer, manager and

operator of a seagoing ship” (Article 1 (2), the LLMC 1976 Convention). Persons
for whom the shipowner is vicariously liable, i.e. crew, pilot, tug and other persons
involved in the operation of the ship, such as those working at the shipowner’s
offices, are also allowed to invoke the limitation rules. Insurers of liability for claims
that are subject to limitation have been given a right of limitation through a provision
in Article 1 (6) of the LLMC 1976 Convention (IMO, 1993, 197).

Under Article 4 of the LLMC 1976 Convention, “if it is proved that the loss resulted
from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such a loss, or
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result”, the person
liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability.

The provisions relating to the loss of the right to limit in the LLMC 1976 Convention
are very similar to the terms used in the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules and
the Athens Convention.

3.2.1.1.2 The specific or contractual limitation

In the Hague-Visby Rules, Article 4, sub paragraph 5 (e), it is stated that “neither the
carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability
provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or
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omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with
knowledge that damage would probably result.” The carrier includes “the owner or
the charterer who enters into a contract of carriage with a shipper.” There is a similar
provision covering the servant or agent of the carrier.

Under the Hamburg Rules, “the carrier is not entitled to the benefit of the limitation
of liability provided for in article 6 if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in
delivery resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with intent to cause such
loss, damage or delay, or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or
delay would probably result.” This limitation also applies to the servant or agent of
the carrier.

In the Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and Their Luggage
by Sea, 1974 and its 1976 & 1990 Protocols, “the carrier shall not be entitled to the
benefit of the limits of liability prescribed in Article 7 and 8 and paragraph 1 of
Article 10, if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the
carrier done with intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that
such damage would probably result.” The limitation is also applied to the servant or
agent of the carrier just like in the Hamburg Rules.

The provisions in these Conventions, the Hague-Visby Rules, the Hamburg Rules,
the Athens Conventions and LLMC 1976 Conventions are quite similar. However,
there still remains some differences among them.

Under the Hamburg Rules, the Athens Convention and the LLMC 1976 Convention,
the knowledge has to be of the particular “loss, damage or delay in delivery”,
“damage” and “loss” that has in fact occurred. Whereas under the Hague-Visby
Rules, the knowledge that any damage would probably result is sufficient, coupled
with recklessness to deprive the carrier of limitation. So it looks as if the HagueVisby Rules are much stricter than the other three Conventions.
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3.2.1.2 National Legislation

International Conventions have no independent life of their own. They require
adoption as part of the national law of participating countries before they become
effective.

The 1957 Convention was originally given domestic effect in the United Kingdom
by the Merchant Shipping (Liability of shipowner and others) Act 1958. The LLMC
1976 Convention applies in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 185 of the
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 (Griggs and Williams, 1998, 3).

The United States has not adopted either the 1957 Convention or the updated LLMC
1976 Convention. The shipowner’s right to limitation of liability is provided by the
Limitation of Vessel Owner’s Liability Act.

The Act gives the right to all

shipowners, American or foreign, to limit their liability for maritime claims resulting
from maritime casualties occasioned in navigable waters, whether American or
foreign. In this Act, shipowners include any person or entity which may be held
liable because of an ownership interest in the vessel, part owners and demise
charterers (Griggs and Williams, 1998, 331-332).

According to the Act, the

shipowner may limit his liability only upon showing proof that the fault causing the
loss occurred without his “privity or knowledge”.

Although China has not ratified or accessed to the 1957 Convention or the LLMC
1976 Convention, some principles of the LLMC 1976 Convention has been adopted
in the provisions related to limitation of liability in the Maritime Code of People’s
Republic of China. This provides in Article 204 that shipowners and salvors may
limit their liability in accordance with the provisions of Chapter XI of the Maritime
Code for claims set out in Article 207. In article 209, it states that “A person liable
shall not be entitled to limit his liability in accordance with the provisions of this
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Chapter, if it is proved that the loss resulted from his personal act or omission done
with the intent to cause such loss or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss
would probably result.” The degree of “recklessly and with knowledge” is less than
“intention” but greater than “negligence”, and similar to “culpable negligence” in
Chinese law. With respect to Articles 204, 205 and 206, the “person liable” could be
the shipowner, manager, salver or their servants or an insurer (Li, 1996).

3.2.2

The impact of the ISM Code

Generally, the ISM Code is not directly concerned with the shipowner’s ability to
limit his liability to a particular figure under any limitation convention. However,
the implementation of the ISM Code may affect many limitation issues. The most
alarming legal implication the ISM Code will have is an inevitable effect on barring
limitation of liability under the 1957 Convention and possibly the LLMC 1976
Convention. The standard of supervision and management required by the ISM
Code will have an effect on assessing concepts such as “actual fault or privity”,
“personal act or omission”, or “recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would
probably result” in limitation cases.

3.2.2.1 Actual fault or privity

Under the 1957 Convention, the shipowner will lose his right to limitation if he fails
to prove that the relevant damage was not caused by his “actual fault or privity”.
Here the ISM Code is likely to have a great direct effect.

First of all, it is necessary to make clear within the organisation whose “actual fault
or privity” can be regarded as the shipowner’s.

There have been many court

decisions in the United Kingdom about this issue. It is clear that it should be the
“actual fault or privity” of someone who is not merely a servant or agent of the
company but rather of someone whose action is of the company itself (Vlasto, 1998).
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In his article “The loss of the right to limit”, Professor Robert Grime (1986, 107)
summarised some cases from English courts, such as the Lennards Carrying Co. v
Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd, the Lady Gwendolen case, the Garden City case and the
Marion case and came to the conclusion that:

“the actual fault of a shipowning company included: a fault brought
home to the Board of Directors; the fault of a proven alter ego who need
not be a Board member; and the fault of a person, partnership or
company which is either a registered ship’s manager or to whom
management has been wholly delegated.”

The person whose “fault or privity” can be regarded as the shipowner must be the
person who represents “the directing minds and will” of the company.

What

circumstance the knowledge or negligence of a person acting with the authority of a
company could be attributed to the company for the purpose of establishing liability
is different in each case.

Generally, the phrase “actual fault or privity” does not raise any question with regard
to malice or reprehensible conduct. Fault does not necessarily imply bad behaviour,
i.e. in legal terms, the purposive breach of some generally binding obligation. It can
also encompass carelessness, lapse of attention or simply inefficiency (Grime, 1986,
104).

A shipowner’s “actual fault” is seldom in question because of the physical separation
between ship and shore. However if the fault causing the accident can be traced back
to managerial shortcomings in the maintenance, manning, training or supply of the
vessel, the ISM Code will certainly help claimants. The ISM Code as a mandatory
law lays down requirements for establishment and maintenance of a Safety
Management System (SMS) within the organisation. So a defect in the SMS may be
sufficient to establish the actual fault on the part of the shipowner. A failure to
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implement the SMS may give rise to allegations that the company’s senior
management is at fault (International Safety Management Code, Part III, 1998). The
ISM Code will enable the claimant to obtain good disclosure of the company’s SMS,
which should have been expressly designed to guard the shipowner against such
failures (Intertanko, 1996, 21).

The “privity” means “with knowledge and consent”. It will be the knowledge and
consent of someone in the organisation, whose consent is properly to be regarded as
the consent of the organisation itself (Vlasto, 1998). To be privy to another’s action
means to have private knowledge of it. Thus “privity” in the phrase “actual fault or
privity” needs to mean no more than that the shipowner was aware of the fault. A
shipowner who knew of, or who wilfully shut his eyes to a fault must take the risk of
being held actually at fault himself as well as privy to the fault of others (Grime,
1986, 109).

In practice, the privity can be proved by showing that someone in a high position
within the organisation knew of the circumstances likely to give rise to the risk and
failed to do what was necessary to remove that risk. The concept of privity can be
extended from the actual knowledge to catch those who turn a blind eye to the
circumstance.

The ISM Code may be relevant to the concept of privity . Article 9 of the ISM Code
requires that the SMS should ensure non-conformities, accidents and hazardous
situations to be reported to the Company. The reporting system will make it more
likely that the shipowner’s management become aware of a safety problem.

The knowledge of a particular problem, for example something affecting
seaworthiness, has been reported by a low level staff member within the
organisation. This knowledge should be passed to the designated person(s) under the
SMS procedures. The designated person(s) should report it to the shipowner’s senior
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management. If the “non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations” have
been reported to the highest level management, under the properly implemented
SMS, the shipowner will have actual knowledge of the problem. The shipowner will
be easily proved to have privity. Then if the company did nothing to settle the
problem and damage occurred as a result of these non-conformities, the shipowner is
turning a blind eye to the situation. In these cases, he may lose his right to limitation.

3.2.2.2 Recklessness with knowledge

Under the LLMC 1976 Convention, a person liable will lose his right to limit liability
if it is proved that “the loss resulted from his personal act or omission committed
with intent to cause such loss or recklessly with knowledge that such loss would
probably result” (Article 4, the LLMC 1976 Convention).

The LLMC 1976 Convention presents a different standard of challenge to the right of
limitation of the person liable, i.e. intentionally causing the loss or doing so
recklessly with knowledge that the loss was a probability. This new standard is
clearly narrower than “actual fault or privity” which is described in the 1957
Convention. First, it specifies in precise terms the mental element which must be
proved in the person entitled to limit.

Second, it applies the mental element,

intention or recklessness, not to the negligent act but to the consequences (Grime,
1986, 110).

In the case of corporations, it is still necessary to consider whose act or omission will
be treated as the “personal” act or omission which may defeat the right to limit. It
seems that the “alter ego” concept will have to be applied in order to ascertain whose
“action is the very action of the company itself” (Griggs and Williams, 1998, 28).
For the claimant to break limitation, he has to prove that the loss or damage claimed
resulted from a personal act or omission of the legal persona of the shipowning
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company. This legal persona of the company has anticipated the likelihood of the
loss or damage but acted or failed to act regardless of that probability.

The word “recklessly” or “recklessness” connotes either carelessness or utter
heedlessness of the consequence with the result that the perpetrator is deemed to
have considered neither the probability nor even the possibility of a like result
(Griggs and Williams, 1998, 30).

According to Heward (1996), the LLMC 1976 Convention is more favourable to
shipowners. It becomes much easier for a shipowner to limit liability than it was
previously. The burden of proof, the recklessness and knowledge has been shifted to
the claimants.

It is doubtful that the ISM Code will have a significant effect upon a shipowner’s
right to limit under the LLMC 1976 Convention (Potential legal implication of ISM
Code, 1996). However the requirement for reporting defects, which affect the safety
of the ship, upwards within the company’s chain of command will increase the risk
to the shipowner’s right of limitation.

Article 4 of the ISM Code requires establishing a link between “the safety operation
of each ship” and “the highest level of management” in the shipowning or operating
company. So if the wrongful act in question consists of or arises out of a breach of
the ISM Code, it will be easier to prove a “personal act or omission” on the part of
the shipowner (Heward, 1996).

If the highest level of management turns a blind eye to a serious safety problem or
fails to correct the shortcoming aboard the ship which has been apparent from the
documents required by Article 9 of the ISM Code, the owner will probably be
regarded as reckless.
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Furthermore, there will be a significantly greater amount of paper in existence
documenting the owner’s safety record. This may provide more evidence to the
claimant to run a limitation argument.

In deciding whether the shipowner’s behaviour was such that it should deprive him
of the right to limit, the court will have to decide whether the standard of behaviour
exhibited fell below the industry norm. The ISM Code provides a standard, which is
accepted by the industry for testing if the shipowner has acted as a reasonable and
prudent shipowner. A two stage test will apply in the case: was there an appropriate
SMS provided by the company and has the company properly implemented the
SMS?

3.2.2.3 The status of the designated person(s)

With the introduction of the designated person(s), an interesting question has been
raised that whether or not the “actual fault or privity” or “personal act or omission,
recklessly with knowledge that the loss will probably result” by the designated
person(s) would constitute an act of the shipowner and result in the loss of right of
limitation.

According to Article 4 of the ISM Code, a person or persons ashore should be
designated to have direct access to the highest level of management in order to
ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the Company
and those on board. The designated person(s) has the responsibility and authority for
monitoring the safety and pollution prevention aspects of the operation of each ship.

There are two opposite opinions to this question. Grime (1995) in his article “Legal
Framework of the Code: Responsibilities and Liabilities” states:
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“Under English law, and in many other jurisdictions, a company is fixed
with the knowledge of any person within the organisation to whom
responsibilities have been properly delegated. A designated person(s) under
the ISM Code must be such a person with regard to the matters contained in
Article 4, the ‘privity’ of the designated person(s) must be the privity of the
Company”.

According to Paranjpe (1997), given the broad scope of the duties of the designated
person(s) under Article 4 of the ISM Code, it is almost certain that the court will
regard the knowledge of the designated person(s) as the knowledge of the shipowner.

On the contrary, some people have argued that because the designated person(s) may
not be the senior manager, his knowledge would not necessarily constitute the
knowledge of the shipowner.

Vlasto (1998) disagrees with the notion that the designated person(s)’s knowledge
and conduct is that of the shipowner. He regards that the designated person(s) as
being lower down the authority chain with the specific task of monitoring the safety
and pollution prevention aspects of the ship operation. The designated person’s
function is a filter. He will have a vast amount of information, much of which will
stay with him. So there may have been knowledge that the designated person(s) had
but did not pass onto the highest level of management.

The latter idea seems correct. The structure and provisions of the ISM Code do not
seem to suggest that the designated person(s) is, or has, to be the directing mind of
the owners on the question of safety. The Code requires the designated person(s) to
have direct access to the highest level of management, so it must presumably indicate
that the designated person(s) need not to be a senior manager himself. In some
companies, he does not even have to be the company’s safety officer.
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The designated person(s) is not the person who is responsible for safety matters in
the Company. His responsibility and authority include only monitoring safety and
ensuring that adequate resources are applied. There is no suggestion in the ISM
Code that the knowledge of the designated person(s) should be deemed to be in the
possession of top management—even in respect of that information which the
designated person(s) ought properly to have passed onto the top management. So the
knowledge of the designated person(s) would not necessarily constitute the
knowledge of the shipowner. His action or omission will not be that of the legal
persona of the company unless it has been stated by the company’s constitution.

In many cases the knowledge of facts possessed by the designated person(s) will
probably not be reported upwards to the highest level of management but sideways to
the responsible member of the technical staff (Intertanko, 1996, 26). But if the
designated person(s) has reported the safety problem to the highest level of
management and included the probable consequence of the problem, the highest
level of management has been made aware of this safety problem, and thus
knowledge will become the knowledge of the shipowner. The shipowner can not
then turn a blind eye. Blind eye knowledge is as good as actual knowledge. If the
top manager consciously decides not to follow up on a report from the designated
person(s) about lack of resources in a particular area which subsequently has a
causative effect on a casualty, the shipowner will be regarded to have privity or show
recklessness to the problem. This will threaten his right to limitation.

3.2.3

Conclusion

The introduction of the ISM Code will make it more difficult to limit under the 1957
Convention, the “actual fault or privity” regime, because of the negative burden of
proof on the shipowner and the information available to the claimant as the
shipowner’s compliance with his ISM Code obligations will be much more extensive
than before.
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The limitation under the LLMC 1976 Convention and other specific/contractual
regimes will still be difficult to challenge. However the liable person’s right to limit
will face more challenges than previously.

There is no doubt that if limitation becomes relevant, the shipowner’s systems and
procedures will be put under the microscope and only the healthiest of specimens are
assured to pass the rigorous test of limitation (Intertanko, 1996, 27). It will be tested
by the courts that whether or not the fault, the knowledge and act or omission of the
designated person(s) should be taken to be those of top management, or of the legal
persona of the company.

The smaller shipowner may suffer more risk than the larger one on limitation issues.
The smaller the organisation, the greater the likelihood will be that most of the
information known to the designated person(s) will equally be known by top
management or the shipowner, especially for that small shipowner who is personally
responsible for the operation of his ship.

He will be, in many respects, more

susceptible to having his limit broken.

On the positive side, if the shipowner or the operator has established, implemented
and maintained an effective SMS, and he “says what he does and does what he says”,
it will be difficult for claimants to prove “recklessness and with the knowledge that
the loss would probably result” (the LLMC 1976 Convention) and “actual fault or
privity” (the 1957 Convention). In the meantime, as complete documenting of the
ship safety operation, the shipowner’s burden of proof under the 1957 Convention
will be easy to satisfy.
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3.3

The other aspects of the civil liability of shipowners

There are some other aspects about shipowners’ civil liability which will be affected
by the introduction of the ISM Code.

3.3.1

Limitation of liability for oil pollution

Oil pollution from ships has been at the focus of attention in international law in the
past 30 years. With the increase in the size of oil tankers, the risk of great oil
pollution damage has also increased.

The public has become more and more

sensitive to the environmental problem. Even a minor oil spill will become an
emotive subject and attract the media. International organisations and governmental
maritime safety agencies are under pressure to intervene actively following a
pollution incident.

The International Convention on Civil Liability of Oil Pollution Damage 1969 (CLC
69) and its revised versions contain regulations governing the shipowners’ liability
for oil pollution damage. Under the Convention, the shipowner has strict liability
for oil pollution damage, i.e. the shipowner is liable without having committed any
error in the accident. However, the shipowner has also been given the right to limit
his liability to a certain amount.

CLC 69 has been incorporated into national laws and regulations by many oil
importing/exporting countries. However some countries have set their own legal
frameworks for oil pollution. One of the most notable examples is the United States,
which enacted its own oil pollution legislation in 1990, i.e. the Oil Pollution Act
1990 (OPA 90). OPA 90 establishes limits of liability for parties responsible for oil
spills in the waters of the United States. These limits of liability do not apply to
those incidents that were proximately caused by the gross negligence or wilful
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misconduct of or in “violation of an applicable federal safety, construction, or
operating regulation” by the responsible party (Intertanko, 1996, 32).

The ISM Code may have little relevance to pollution claims which are governed by
international conventions. Since the shipowner has strict liability for oil pollution
damage, all claims are channelled to the carrier. However in practice, the ISM Code
may be relevant to issues of breaking limitation.

Under CLC 69, the shipowner “shall not be entitled to avail himself of the
limitation”, “if the incident occurred as a result of the actual fault or privity of the
owner” (Article V-2, CLC 69). In the 1984 revised version of CLC, “the owner shall
not be entitled to limit his liability under this convention if it is proved that the
pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission, committed with the
intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with the knowledge that such damage
would probably result”. Obviously, the condition in CLC 69 is similar to the 1957
Limitation Convention and conditions in the 1984 revised version (not in force) and
the 1992 Protocols are similar to the LLMC 1976 Convention as discussed in section
3.2 of this chapter.

Generally, the extensive records that shipowners are required to keep under the ISM
Code will be used as evidence against the shipowner in the court. Under the ISM
Code, the shipowner will be required to examine his own operations and document
any non-conformities with international safety and pollution prevention standards.
These documents will provide an opportunity to place the shipowner in a bad
position in the claim. Any inconsistencies or omissions in the shipowner’s records
could be used in court to call the shipowner’s credibility into question (Maritime
lawyer warns that ISM Code requirements could hurt shipowner in court, 1997).
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On the other hand, the entity identified on the DOC as a vessel’s manager would
very likely be considered as the “operator” under OPA 90. So the ISM Code may
help to identify who is the responsible party in the claim under OPA 90.

3.3.2

Death of or personal injury to passengers

Passenger death or personal injury claims are generally based upon fault and may
well be affected by the ISM Code.

The Athens Convention Relating to the Carriage of Passengers and their Luggage by
Sea, 1974, governs such kinds of claims. Shipowner’s liability under this convention
is based on “fault or neglect”. It is stated in Article 3 that “the carrier shall be liable
for the damage suffered as a result of the death of or personal injury to a passenger ...
if the incident which caused the damage so suffered ... was due to the fault or neglect
of the carrier or of his servants or agents acting within the scope of their
employment”.

The shipowner has the right to limit his liability, but this limitation will be broken “if
it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with
the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that such damage
would probably result” (Article 13, the Athens Convention).

The impact of the ISM Code on the fault or neglect of the carrier and on the
shipowner’s right to limit his liability are similar to conditions which have already
been discussed in sections 3.1 and 3.2 of this chapter.

3.3.3

Collision liability

Most collision accidents are caused by human error, i.e. mistakes in navigational
procedures. Collision liability will be around issues of fault which are usually
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established by references to agreed standards of navigation, such as the International
Rules for Preventing Collisions at Sea and good seamanship in practice (Grime,
1995).

The ISM Code may have some relevance to these issues. The qualification and
training of the crew on board, the adequacy of the charts and the watch-keeping
system, familiarity with the collision rules and other safety regulations and so on,
must all be regulated by the ship’s SMS.

3.3.4

Charterparty claims

Charterparty claims may also find room for the ISM Code.

Both time and voyage charterparties contain provisions clearly stating or
incorporating the Hague-Visby Rules into the charterparty to ensure that providing a
seaworthy ship is a central obligation of the shipowner.

It seems that in further charterparty claims, the shipowner’s seaworthiness
obligations will also extend to exercising due diligence to comply with the provisions
of the ISM Code (Intertanko, 1996, 35-36). Not only are a valid DOC and SMC
required to exist, but the vessel should also have a properly implemented and
maintained SMS which complies with the ISM Code.

The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO), after consulting the
International Group of P & I Clubs, drafted a Standard ISM Clause in March 1998 to
be incorporated into both time and voyage charterparties in the future. The BIMCO
Standard ISM Clause requires that shipowners “shall procure that both the vessel and
the Company (as defined by the ISM Code) shall comply with the requirements of
the ISM Code” and “except as otherwise provided in this charterparty, loss, damage,
expense or delay caused by failure on the part of the owners or the Company to
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comply with the ISM Code shall be for the owners’ account” (Brokers and the ISM
Code, 1998). If this clause has been incorporated into the charterparty concluded,
the shipowner will be in an unfavourable position in the charterparty claim in case of
any breach of requirement of the ISM Code.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of the ISM Code on Ship Owner’s Criminal Liability

Neither the International Safety management (ISM) Code nor the International
Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Chapter IX have imposed any specific
criminal liability on shipowners for failing to comply with their provisions. This is
because parties of the international conventions are states rather than individual
shipowners. However, the implementation of the ISM Code will have an impact on a
shipowner’s criminal liability. The failure to comply with the ISM Code may result
in liability being established under an independent criminal statute. On the other
hand, in some jurisdictions it may give rise to criminal sanctions under the legislation
implementing the ISM Code itself (International Safety Management Code, Part III,
1998).

Criminal law approaches vary greatly from one country to another. This Chapter
will focus on the English law system to see how the ISM Code will affect the
shipowner’s criminal liability under the United Kingdom Merchant Shipping Act
1995 and the Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill which was recommended by the Law
Commission in 1995.

4.1

The Merchant Shipping Act 1995

Manslaughter or criminal negligence charges are often brought against senior crew
members following incidents involving loss of life.

In some cases, technical

superintendents or other shore based personnel will also be at risk. Under the
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Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sections 98 and 100, which revised the Merchant
Shipping Act 1988 sections 30 and 32, running a dangerously unsafe ship or the
unsafe operation of a ship are statutory criminal offences for which the master and
the shipowner may be convicted (Intertanko, 1996, 50). This will also apply to the
charterer or manager who has concluded a charter party or management agreement
with the shipowner.

A large majority of ships are owned or managed by companies. So whether the
owing or managing company would be guilty of involuntary corporate manslaughter
under common law in the event of loss of life resulting from breach of duty of care
through unsafe operation of a ship will depend on the application of the gross
negligence test, which was adopted by the House of Lords in the R v Adomako case.
The test includes the following steps: firstly, whether the individual defendant was
negligent; secondly, did the breach of duty of care cause death? thirdly, should the
breach of duty be characterised as gross negligence and, therefore a crime? The
company will be convicted of manslaughter if the independent defendant, who is a
key individual in the corporate structure, has been proved guilty of manslaughter
himself (Macdonald, 1998).

Just as Bingham L. J. said in R v HM Coroner for East Kent case:

“A company may be vicariously liable for the negligent acts and
omissions of its servants and agents, but for a company to be criminally
liable for manslaughter...it is required that manslaughter should be
established not against those who acted for or in the name of the
company but against who were to be identified as the embodiment of the
company itself” (Macdonald, 1998).

Those who control the corporation will be treated as embodying the corporation. The
alter ego or “directing mind and will” of the company is established by reference to

47

the conduct of key officers.

Generally speaking, the managing director and/or

directors of a UK registered company (or their equivalent in foreign corporations)
can represent the company’s “directing mind and will” (Macdonald, 1998). This
can also be called the Principle of Identification.

4.2

The Herald of Free Enterprise disaster

The Ro/Ro passenger and freight ferry Herald of Free Enterprise was owned by
Townsend Car Ferries Limited, which was a subsidiary of the Peninsular & Oriental
Steam Navigation Company at the time of the casualty. On the 6th March 1987, the
ferry Herald of Free Enterprise sailed from the inner harbour of Zeebrugge at 1805
GMT. She was manned by 80 crew members and laden with 81 cars, 47 freight
vehicles and three other vehicles. Approximately 459 passengers were onboard the
ship. The Herald of Free Enterprise passed the outer mole at 1824 and capsizes
about four minutes later. No less than 150 passengers and 38 crew members lost
their lives and many others were injured (UK Department of Transport, 1987, 1).

The Herald of Free Enterprise capsized because she went to sea with her inner and
outer bow doors open. The assistant bosun, who had the duty to close the bow doors
at the time of departure from Zeebrugge, failed to carry out his duty. The chief
officer also failed to check and ensure that the bow doors were secure when leaving
port. According to the General Instruction issued by the company in July 1984, as
the officer for loading the main vehicle deck, it was the chief officer’s duty to check
and ensure the bow doors to be secured. It is clearly that the negligence of the
assistant bosun and the chief officer were the immediate cause of the disaster.

This was not the first occasion on which such a failure had occurred. In October
1983, the assistant bosun of the Pride of Free Enterprise, the sister ship of Herald of
Free Enterprise, had fallen asleep and as a result he neglected to close both the bow
and stern doors on the sailing of the vessel from Dover.
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The Court finally found that the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise was partly
caused or contributed to by serious negligence in the discharge of their duties by the
master, the chief officer and the assistant bosun, and partly caused or contributed to
by the fault of the shipowner. As a consequence, the certificates of the master and
the chief officer were suspended by the Court (UK Department of Transport, 1987).

During the prosecution of the shipowner, the Judge recognised that the identification
principle allowed mens rea to be imputed to the corporation, thus permitting criminal
convictions including manslaughter. But the trial against the shipowner and most
senior individual defendants failed. As discussed before, to convict the company of
manslaughter, individual defendants who can be identified as the company should
have to be guilty of manslaughter themselves. But in this case, there was not
sufficient evidence of such culpability (Macdonald, 1998).

4.3

Law Commission Recommendation

The success of the criminal charges against individuals concerned or the company
itself for involuntary manslaughter or similar is, more or less, in order to placate
angry relatives and the local press (Intertanko, 1996, 50). There was a widespread
feeling in the public that it was wrong that the criminal law placed all the blame on
junior employees who may be held individually responsible but did nothing to fix
responsibility on their employers who operated and profited from the service.

The Law Commission recommended in 1995 the introduction of a new offence of
“corporate killing” for which a company may be liable if the death resulted from
management failure and the failure constituted conduct falling below what could
reasonably be expected of the corporation in that circumstance (International Safety
Management Code, Part III, 1998). There is no process of identifying corporate
culpability through the “directing mind and will” of individuals.
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Clause 4 of the Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill provides:

“4 (1). A corporation is guilty of corporate killing if—
(a) a management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the
causes of a person’s death; and
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can reasonably
be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above—
(a) there is a management failure by the corporation if the way in which
its activities are managed or organised fails to ensure the health and
safety of persons employed in or affected by those activities; and
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person’s death
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an
individual.”

If this new offence or something similar is introduced, it will be the shipowner’s duty
to provide a safe system of work. The shipowner’s conduct will be tested by whether
there was a failure to ensure safety in the management or organisation of the
corporation’s activities.

Corporate killing will be committed only where the company’s conduct fell far below
what could reasonably be expected in the circumstances.

Practices generally

regarded as acceptable within the industry may be considered.

4.4

The impact of the ISM Code

The introduction of the ISM Code may have an effect on both the present and
possible future criminal law.
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The ISM Code requires a company to collect and maintain a large amount of
information about its Safety Management System (SMS).

It will give the

opportunity to the court to learn much more about the company than in the past. In
the meantime, it provides a road map for investigation and judicial proceedings.

Under the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, to convict a corporation of criminal liability,
the individual defendant, whose gross negligence leads to a charge of corporate
manslaughter against the corporation, must be identified as a key individual in the
corporation. The company’s SMS and the contents of their manuals will help to
identify the key person who can represent the company’s directing mind and will.
For example, Article 3.2 of the ISM Code requires that the company has to define
and document the responsibility and authority of personnel who manage, perform
and verify work relating to safety and pollution prevention issues. This will give the
necessary information for the identification.

The designated person(s) will still be the point at issue. Would possible gross
negligence of the designated person(s) in the exercise of his duties be imputed upon
the company? An effective designated person(s) will bring the knowledge about
crew, cargo, navigation etc to the company’s alter ego. Although he may be found
guilty himself, he is not by the ISM Code made the person responsible for the
operation of a ship but only for monitoring safety matters. He has the duty to give
reports and advice to the company’s senior management.

But he does not

automatically represent the directing mind and will of the company, unless it has
been clearly mentioned in the company’s constitution.

It seems that the ISM Code may have more impact on “corporate killing”, the new
offence. Factors, which are related to management failure will include inadequate
safety procedures, lack of safety training and managers ignoring a known problem
(Macdonald, 1998). All these aspects will be affected by the ISM Code.
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In article 1.4 of the ISM Code, the Company is required to develop, implement and
maintain a SMS which includes instructions and procedures to ensure the safe
operation of ships. Procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the
provisions of the ISM Code are also required.

The Company should ensure that any training, which may be required in support of
the SMS, is provided for all personnel concerned (Article 6.5, the ISM code).

The report and analysis of non-conformities, accidents and hazardous situations and
the implementation of the corrective action is another most important requirement of
the ISM Code (Article 9, the ISM Code).

The ISM Code provides a guideline for the company to prevent any management
failure. In the meantime, it also provides a standard to test whether the company has
management failure within the operation of the ship. A breach of the ISM Code and
non-conformities of the SMS will be regarded as management failure, which may
lead to criminal prosecution.

On the other hand, the offence will be committed only where the company’s conduct
falls far below what could be expected in the circumstances. The ISM Code, as an
international standard for the safe management and operation of ships, will be
regarded as an accepted industry standard for measuring and judging the relevant
conduct of the shipowner.

Now let us review the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster and see the possible legal
consequences if it had happened after the ISM Code had entered into force.

The immediate cause of the deaths was the conduct of the assistant bosun, the chief
officer or both. Another cause was the fact that the company failed to establish an
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adequate safety system for the operation of the ship (Macdonald, 1998). The assistant
bosun should never have been in the position where the safety of the ship and its
passengers depended on him without any adequate system of checks or controls.
This failure might be found to be far below what could reasonably have been
expected.

The Board of Directors did not appreciate their responsibilities for the safe
management of their ships. This was not the first occasion on which the company’s
ship had gone to sea with doors open. Earlier incidents should have been reported by
the designated person(s) to the highest level of management, but the management
had not acted upon the report and a similar incident happened again.

All this evidences will be used against the shipowner. It shows that the senior
management had failures in the safe management of its ships and the company had
management failure. It will be thus easy to charge the shipowner with the crime.

However, if the ISM Code had already entered into force and the company had acted
correctly according to the requirements of the ISM Code, the Herald of Free
Enterprise disaster and similar accidents would, hopefully, not have happened.

On the positive side, if a company can show through its SMS documentation that it is
committed to correcting deficiencies and improving its safety and environmental
record, the shipowner will be in a better position to deal with the criminal litigation
and to plead mitigating circumstance.

53

Chapter 5

The Impact of the ISM Code on Marine Insurance

Although the marine transport technology has developed very fast and navigation has
become safer than before, sea transport is still a high risk business. All persons
engaged in shipping constantly incur considerable risks. Shipowners may suffer loss
or damage to their ships and become liable to pay damages to other ships or to cargo
owners as well as pay for the damage to the marine environment. They may also
become liable for the loss of life or personal injury of crew members or passengers
onboard. So it has long been a practice to insure against the consequences of marine
perils.

The International Safety Management (ISM) Code sets an international

standard for ensuring safety at sea, prevention of human injury or loss of life and
avoidance of damage to the environment in particular to the marine environment and
to property. It may have a significant effect on marine insurance.

5.1 Change of policy

The International Group of P & I Clubs, Hull and Machinery underwriters and cargo
insurers all have adjusted conditions in policies to meet the introduction of the ISM
Code.

The rules of the P & I Clubs contain a provision that the vessel entered shall comply
with the statutory requirements. The ISM Code forms a part (Chapter IX) of the
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention. With the
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coming into force of the ISM Code and implementation into the national laws of
relevant flag states, the compliance with the ISM Code has become a mandatory
requirement. It is also the policy decision of most of the Clubs that they do not
accept entry of any vessel which has not complied with the relevant ISM Code
requirements. Shipowners who did not get the required ISM certificates, i.e. a
Document of Compliance (DOC) for owners/managers and a Safety Management
Certificate (SMC) for the ship, were not able to renew their existing P & I cover with
an International Group club in 1999(Levy, 1998).

Rule 29.1.4 of the Assuranceforeningen Skuld (Gjensidig) (Skuld), one of the
leading P & I clubs in Norway, includes the requirement for compliance with the
ISM Code, It reads:

“The member shall comply with all statutory requirements of the state of
the vessel’s flag, relating to the construction, adaptation, condition,
fitment, equipment, manning, operation and management of the entered
vessel (including applicable requirements of the ISM Code) and maintain
the validity of the statutory certificates issued by or on behalf of the
vessel’s flag state in relation to such requirements” (Skuld, 1999, 53).

Skuld also decided to include necessary information relating to the ISM Code within
the Skuld entry form. The form must be completed by the company, which applies
to enter a vessel with the club. So the valid ISM certificates are being “conditions
precedent” for entry (Levy, 1998).

The lack of necessary ISM certificates will result in the termination or suspension of
the P & I cover. If a vessel has been entered when the shipowners or managers have
their DOC and the vessel its SMC in place, then the member has a continuing
obligation to comply with all the statutory requirements of the flag state of the vessel,
including the ISM Code.
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The P & I insurance is a liability insurance. It gives the insurance cover to the
assured member for errors and omissions made by employees for which the member
can be held liable. The introduction of the ISM Code does not change this at all.
The P & I clubs will still cover liabilities, losses, expenses and costs caused by nonconformity with the ISM Code. However, according to the rules of Skuld, the
member will lose the cover from the club if a non-conformity has been reported to
him but he did nothing to rectify it, or the member turned a blind eye by not ensuring
that a system is in place where a non-conformity is reported to him, unless the
member can prove that liability, loss, expense and cost would have been incurred in
any event. This rule is only applicable to losses which have causal relation with the
member’s non-conformity. Other losses which have no such causal relation will still
be covered by the club (Levy, 1998).

A limited exclusion clause was issued by the Joint Cargo Committee (JCC) of
Lloyd’s in May 1998. Under this clause, cargo owners who are aware of, or should
have been aware that the insured cargo is carried by a non-ISM compliant vessel or
whose owners/operators do not hold a DOC will lose insurance cover from cargo
underwriters. Of course, the innocent cargo assured who may unwittingly find their
cargoes shipped on non-certified vessels, will still be covered (London insurers act
on ISM: New cargo clause introduced, 1998).

In the meantime, the London market’s Joint Hull Committee (JHC) also issued a new
set of guidelines on dealing with claims. Shipowners/operators will be required to
show the DOC, the SMC and a statement from the designated person(s) that all
relevant ISM Code procedures have been complied with before the hull underwriters
start considering the claim (Key players express hopes on ISM Code, July 3, 1998).

Marine underwriters also give notice that insuring ships without ISM certificates
could be illegal in certain circumstances. There may be allegations of criminal
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conspiracy to breach or evade the legal requirement imposed by the flag state, e.g.,
the Merchant Shipping Act of United Kingdom (International Safety Management
Code, Part III, 1998).

5.2 Unseaworthiness

Issues of seaworthiness and privity are directly relevant to a shipowner’s ability to
recover under a voyage or time policy.

Under the English Marine Insurance Act 1906, “in a voyage policy there is an
implied warranty that at the commencement of the voyage the ship shall be
seaworthy for the purpose of the particular adventure insured” and “in a time policy
there is no implied warranty that the ship shall be seaworthy at any stage of the
adventure, but where, with the privity of the assured, the ship is sent to sea in an
unseaworthy state, the insurer is not liable for any loss attributable to
unseaworthiness” (Section 39 (1) and (5)).

According to the Norwegian Marine Insurance Plan of 1964, section 45, “the insurer
is not liable for loss that is a consequence of the ship not being in a seaworthy
condition, provided that the assured was or ought to have been aware of the ship’s
defects at such a time that it would have been possible for him to intervene.”

Article 244 of the Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China concerns
unseaworthiness. It reads:

“unless otherwise agreed in the insurance contract, the insurer shall not
be liable for the loss of or damage to the insured ship arising from any of
the following causes:
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(1) Unseaworthiness of the ship at the time of the commencement of
the voyage, unless where under a time policy the insured has the
knowledge thereof.”

It is not easy to apply these provisions in practice because insurers have to prove the
unseaworthiness as well as the fact that the assured knew or ought to have known the
unseaworthiness (Intertanko, 1996, 37).

Generally, unseaworthiness includes human failure, a poorly manned or managed
ship may well be an unseaworthy ship. The owner’s privity has the same meaning as
in limitation cases.

The insurance shall not cover liability or loss caused

intentionally or by a reckless act or omission by the assured.

The introduction of the ISM Code will directly affect on these issues.

First, the ISM Code, as a safety standard, will be used as a yardstick for ascertaining
whether the ship is unseaworthy. Non-compliance with the requirement of the ISM
Code and the assured’s own SMS will be easily proved as unseaworthiness. So if a
ship is poorly managed through being in breach of the ISM Code and the loss or
damage was caused by that failure, the assured will lose his insurance cover because
of unseaworthiness.

Secondly, it will help to identify whether the assured was privy to the
unseaworthiness. The ISM Code requires to establish a chain of command leading
up to the highest level of management and fixes every person in that chain with a
degree of responsibility for safety matters.

The designated person(s) is a very

important person in this chain. His duties are supervision and monitoring. He has to
know the operation, the actual condition and management of the ship. The ISM
Code also requires reporting of non-conformities to the Company. The designated
person(s) is the receiver of all reports. If the designated person(s) knew about the
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defect, it will be difficult for a person or persons who comprise the alter ego or the
top management of an insured company to claim that he/they did not know the defect
onboard the ship. If the designated person(s) is privy to any non-conformity or
problem in general, the company will be assumed to by privy to these.

5.3 Duty of disclosure

The “utmost good faith” principle is one of the fundamental principles common to all
insurance, but law of marine insurance requires an even higher standard of honesty.
The English Marine Insurance Act 1906, section 17 states that “a contract of marine
insurance is a contract based upon the utmost good faith, and, if the utmost good
faith be not observed by either party, the contract may be avoided by the other
party.” Marine underwriters seldom inspect the object of insurance, i.e., the ship or
cargoes.

The decision of the insurer to underwrite the risk is based on the

information provided by the assured and that information is accepted in good faith.
So it is an absolute obligation on the assured to disclose all material facts which are
known to him or which he is deemed to have known. The effect of non-disclosure is
that the insurer will avoid the insurance contract (Donner, 1999).

It is very important for the insurer to obtain the best available information about the
risk to be undertaken. That is why the assured is required to disclose to the insurer
every material circumstance, which would influence the judgement of a prudent
insurer in fixing the premium, or determining whether he will take the risk. But in
practice, it is always a question of what kind of circumstance is material and must be
disclosed.
subject.

The English Marine Insurance Act 1906 did not help much on this
It only provides some circumstances, which need not to be disclosed.

Generally, “only circumstances relating to the subject matter of the insurance, the
ship and the perils are material” (Gaskell, and et al, 1998, 529). They are those
factors, which as material to the risks considered in their own nature, a prudent and
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experienced underwriter would deem it proper to consider” (Gaskell, and et al, 1998,
530).

Failure to give accurate loss record information would be an obvious non-disclosure
argument (Intertanko, 1996, 41). The technical conditions, defects onboard the ship
should also be disclosed to the insurer.

The ISM Code may have an effect on these issues. First, the ISM Code lays down a
requirement for the shipowner/operator/manager to establish and maintain a
reporting system. Any non-conformity with the Safety Management System (SMS)
and deficiency onboard the ship should be reported from ship to shore.

The

designated person(s) is the person who provides a link between ships and shore. He
also has a direct access to the highest level of management.

So all the non-

conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences should be reported to the top
management along this link. The shipowner will find it more difficult to turn a blind
eye and say he did not know about the incident. If he did not disclose the defect
which should have been disclosed to the insurer, he may breach the duty of
disclosure and lose the insurance cover.

Secondly, the ISM Code also requires the company to document all ISM related
activities. It will be easier for insurers to find, from a review of the ship’s ISM
record following a casualty and a claim on the policy, whether or not the assured
failed to disclose defects either in the SMS or in the implementation of the SMS.

Although the assured has held necessary ISM certificates, but after investigations of
a major casualty it is found that the SMS has not been properly implemented, and a
deficiency existed but was not reported or dealt with. The insurer might argue that
the shipowners’ circumstances had not been disclosed or had been misrepresented.
As a consequence, they may avoid the policy.
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Chapter 6

Conclusions

Neither the International Safety Management (ISM) Code nor the Chapter IX of the
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention is directly
concerned with issues of civil and criminal liability of the shipowner or his
commercial or contractual relations with third parties. However, the ISM Code will
affects a shipowner’s legal responsibility on issues such as liability for cargo claims
or claims following a casualty, his ability to limitation of liability and insurance
arrangements.

First, the ISM Code lays down an industry-wide uniform standard for safe
management of ships and environment protection.

This standard, which will

probably be regarded as a minimum standard, will be used for evaluating the
shipowner’s performance on issues such as seaworthiness, manning and training of
personnel by assessing the adequacy and implementation of the shipowner’s Safety
Management System (SMS). The judge will have a benchmark to evaluate whether
due diligence was exercised or the minimum standard of supervision and
management was applied. The failure to meet that standard will be construed as lack
of due diligence of the shipowner.

Secondly, the ISM Code requires the shipowner to set up a report and analysis
system. All the non-conformities, accidents and hazardous occurrences should be
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reporting from the ship up to the highest level of management through the report
chain. The system should ensure that analysis and corrective action have been done.
The shipowner will know everything concerned with safety and pollution prevention
within the organisation. It will affect the shipowner’s ability to limit his liability for
maritime claims and the shipowner’s insurance cover.

Thirdly, the safety management and pollution prevention issues of the organisation
become much more transparent. The ISM Code requires the company to document
all matters relevant to the SMS and maintain these documents. These records and
data about the safety and pollution prevention will make it easy for a claimant to get
enough documentary evidence concerning with the structure and organisation of the
shipowner, the operation of the ship and its condition and seaworthiness. This may
affect the shipowner’s task in defending marine claims. So it is a strong suggestion
that shipowners keep the records and documents simple, direct and not overly subject
to interpretation.

Fourthly, the designated person(s) is a quite new concept in maritime law as well as
in the international shipping industry. The actual legal status of the designated
person(s) is still not quite clear, although it has been the subject of extensive
deliberation and speculation amongst many lawyers, journalists and other wellintentioned commentators (Anderson, 1998, 63). It is unlikely to become clear until
it has been tested in the courts. However, in fact, the actual interest lies in the legal
implication of the relationship between the designated person(s) and the highest level
of management of the organisation, the actual knowledge of the designated person(s)
and how this new concept affects the shipowner’s liability for maritime claims. It
will still be interesting for people in the shipping industry to discuss topics relevant
to the designated person(s), the qualification requirements for the designated
person(s), his level of authority, his budgetary powers, his rank, whether and to what
extent he administers or directs and to whom he should report on a daily basis or in
special cases to the highest level of management etc.
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Fifthly, the objectives of the ISM Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of
human injury or loss of life and avoidance of damage to the environment and to
property. So from the optimistic point of view, if the company has developed an
adequate SMS and properly implements and maintains it according to the
requirements of the ISM Code, hopefully, it will help the shipowner to improve his
safety management and reduce marine accidents and casualties. As a consequence,
shipowners may face less marine claims and they will be in a favourable position for
defending themselves in the courts. It can assist the diligent shipowner to show that
an accident at sea did not occur as a result of poor management.

The ISM Code has been in into force for one year. However, up to now, there is no
court decision concerning the legal impact of the ISM Code on shipowner’s liability.
As Professor Robert P. Grime (1995) said in his article: “there is still much that is
doubtful and unclear about the legal impact of the ISM Code. No one can, however,
doubt its importance.” It will be interesting to see how the law develops in this field.
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Appendix 1:
Resolution A.741(18) of the International Maritime Organization
Resolution A.741(18)
Adopted on 4 November 1993

INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT CODE FOR THE SAFE OPERATION
OF SHIPS AND FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION
(International Safety Management (ISM) Code)

THE ASSEMBLY,
RECALLING Article 150) of the Convention on the International Maritime Organization
concerning the functions of the Assembly in relation to regulations and guidelines concerning
maritime safety and the prevention and control of marine pollution from ships,
RECALLING ALSO resolution A.680(17), by which it invited Member Governments to
encourage those responsible for the management and operation of ships to take appropriate
steps to develop, implement and assess safety and pollution-prevention management in
accordance with the IMO Guidelines on Management for the Safe Operation of Ships and for
Pollution Prevention,
RECALLING ALSO resolution A.596(15), by which it requested the Maritime Safety
Committee to develop, as a matter of urgency, guidelines, wherever relevant, concerning
shipboard and shore-based management, and its decision to include in the work programme
of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection Committee an
item on shipboard and shore-based management for the safe operation of ships and for the
prevention of marine pollution, respectively,
RECALLING FURTHER resolution A.441 (XI), by which it invited every State to take the
necessary steps to ensure that the owner of a ship which flies the flag of that State provides
such State with the current information necessary to enable it to identify and contact the
person contracted or otherwise entrusted by the owner to discharge his responsibilities for
that ship in regard to matters relating to maritime safety and the protection of the marine
environment,
RECALLING FURTHER resolution A.443(XI), by which it invited Governments to take the
necessary steps to safeguard the shipmaster in the proper discharge of his responsibilities in
regard to maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment,
RECOGNIZING the need for appropriate Organization of management to enable it to
respond to the need of those on board ships to achieve and maintain high standards of
safety and environmental protection,
RECOGNIZING ALSO that the most important means of preventing maritime casualties and
pollution of the sea from ships is to design, construct, equip and maintain ships and to
operate them with properly trained crews in compliance with international conventions and
standards relating to maritime safety and pollution prevention,
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NOTING that the Maritime Safety Committee is developing requirements for adoption by
Contracting Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS),- 1974, which will make compliance with the Code referred to in operative
paragraph I mandatory,
CONSIDERING that the early implementation of that Code would greatly assist in improving
safety at sea and protection of the marine environment,
NOTING FURTHER that the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment
Protection Committee have reviewed resolution A.680(l 7) and the Guidelines annexed
thereto in developing the Code,
HAVING CONSIDERED the recommendations made by the Maritime Safety Committee at
its sixty-second session and by the Marine Environment Protection Committee at its thirtyfourth session,
1.
ADOPTS the International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and
for Pollution Prevention (International Safety Management (ISM) Code), set out in the annex
to the present resolution;
2.
STRONGLY URGES Governments to implement the ISM Code on a national basis,
giving priority to passenger ships, tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and mobile offshore
units which are flying their flags, as soon as possible but not later than 1 June 1998, pending
development of the mandatory application of the Code;
3.
REQUESTS Governments to inform the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine
Environment Protection Committee of the action they have taken in implementing the ISM
Code;
4.
REQUESTS the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment Protection
Committee to develop Guidelines for the implementation of the ISM Code;
5.
REQUESTS ALSO the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine Environment
Protection Committee to keep the Code and its associated Guidelines under review and to
amend them as necessary;
REVOKES Resolution A.680(17).
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PREAMBLE
1
The purpose of this Code is to provide an international standard for the safe
management and operation of ships and for pollution prevention.
2
The Assembly adopted resolution A.443(XI), by which it invited all Governments to
take the necessary steps to safeguard the shipmaster in the proper discharge of his
responsibilities with regard to maritime safety and the protection of the marine environment.
3
The Assembly also adopted resolution A.680(l 7), by which it further recognized the
need for appropriate organization of management to enable it to respond to the need of
those on board ships to achieve and maintain high standards of safety and environmental
protection.
4
Recognizing that no two shipping companies or shipowners are the same, and that
ships operate under a wide range of different conditions, the Code is based on general
principles and objectives.
5
The Code is expressed in broad terms so that it can have a widespread application.
Clearly, different levels of management, whether shore-based or at sea, will require varying
levels of knowledge and awareness of the items outlined.
6
The cornerstone of good safety management is commitment from the top. In matters
of safety and pollution prevention it is the commitment, competence, attitudes and motivation
of individuals at all levels that determines the end result.
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1

GENERAL

1.1

Definitions

1.1.1 International Safety Management (ISM) Code means the International Management
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention as adopted by the
Assembly, as may be amended by the Organization.
1.1.2 Company means the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as
the manager, or the bare boat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of
the ship from the shipowner and who on assuming such responsibility has agreed to take
over all the duties and responsibility imposed by the Code.
1.1.3

Administration means the Government of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to

fly.
1.2

Objectives

1.2.1 The objectives of the Code are to ensure safety at sea, prevention of human injury
or loss of life, and avoidance of damage to the environment, in particular to the marine
environment, and to property.
1.2.2

Safety-management objectives of the Company should, inter alia:
.1
provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
.2
establish safeguards against all identified risks; and
.3
continuously improve safety-management skills of personnel ashore and
aboard ships, including preparing for emergencies related both to safety and
environmental protection. t

1.2.3

The safety-management system should ensure:
.1
compliance with mandatory rules and regulations; and
.2
that applicable codes, guidelines and standards recommended by the
Organization, Administrations, classification societies and maritime industry
organizations are taken into account.

1.3

Application

The requirements of this Code may be applied to all ships.
1.4

Functional requirements for a safety management system (SMS)

Every Company should develop, implement and maintain a safety management system
(SMS) which includes the following functional requirements:
.1
a safety and environmental-protection policy;
.2
instructions and procedures to ensure safe operation of ships and protection
of the environment in compliance with relevant international and flag State
legislation;
.3
defined levels of authority and lines of communication between, and
amongst, shore and shipboard personnel;
.4
procedures for reporting accidents and non-conformities with the provisions
of this Code;
.5
procedures to prepare for and respond to emergency situations; and
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.6
2

procedures for internal audits and management reviews.

SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION POLICY

2.1
The Company should establish a safety and environmental-protection policy which
describes how the objectives given in paragraph 1.2 will be achieved.
2.2
The Company should ensure that the policy is implemented and maintained at all
levels of the organization, both ship-based as well as shore-based.
3

COMPANY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY

3.1
If the entity who is responsible for the operation of the ship is other than the owner,
the owner must report the full name and details of such entity to the Administration.
3.2
The Company should define and document the responsibility, authority and
interrelation of all personnel who manage, perform and verify work relating to and affecting
safety and pollution prevention.
3.3
The Company is responsible for ensuring that adequate resources and shore-based
support are provided to enable the designated person or persons to carry out their functions.
4

DESIGNATED PERSON(S)

To ensure the safe operation of each ship and to provide a link between the company and
those on board, every company, as appropriate, should designate a person or persons
ashore having direct access to the highest level of management. The responsibility and
authority of the designated person or persons should include monitoring the safety and
pollution-prevention aspects of the operation of each ship and ensuring that adequate
resources and shore-based support are applied, as required.
5

RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY

5.1
The Company should clearly define and document the master's responsibility with
regard to:
.1
implementing the safety and environmental-protection policy of the
Company;
.2
motivating the crew in the observation of that policy;
.3
issuing appropriate orders and instructions in a clear and simple manner;
.4
verifying that specified requirements are observed; and
.5
reviewing the SMS and reporting its deficiencies to the shore-based
management.
5.2
The Company should ensure that the SMS operating on board the ship contains a
clear statement emphasizing the master's authority. The Company should establish in the
SMS that the master has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions
with respect to safety and pollution prevention and to request the Company's assistance as
may be necessary.

6

RESOURCES AND PERSONNEL

The Company should ensure that the master is:
.1
properly qualified for command;
.2
fully conversant with the Company's SMS; and
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.3

given the necessary support so that the master's duties can be safely
performed.

6.2
The Company should ensure that each ship is manned with qualified, certificated
and medically fit seafarers in accordance with national and international requirements.
6.3
The Company should establish procedures to ensure that new personnel and
personnel transferred to new assignments related to safety and protection of the
environment are given proper familiarization with their duties. Instructions which are
essential to be provided prior to sailing should be identified, documented and given.
6.4
The Company should ensure that all personnel involved in the Company's SMS
have an adequate understanding of relevant rules, regulations, codes and guidelines.
6.5
The Company should establish and maintain procedures for identifying any training
which may be required in support of the SMS and ensure that such training is provided for all
personnel concerned.
6.6
The Company should establish procedures by which the ship's personnel receive
relevant information on the SMS in a working language or languages understood by them.
6.7
The Company should ensure that the ship's personnel are able to communicate
effectively in the execution of their duties related to the SMS.
7

DEVELOPMENT OF PLANS FOR SHIPBOARD OPERATIONS

The Company should establish procedures for the preparation of plans and instructions for
key shipboard operations concerning the safety of the ship and the prevention of pollution.
The various tasks involved should be defined and assigned to qualified personnel.

8

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

The Company should establish procedures to identify, describe and respond to potential
emergency shipboard situations.
The Company should establish programmes for drills and exercises to prepare for
emergency actions.
The SMS should provide for measures ensuring that the Company's organization can
respond at any time to hazards, accidents and emergency situations involving its ships.
9
REPORTS AND ANALYSIS OF NON-CONFORMITIES, ACCIDENTS AND
HAZARDOUS OCCURRENCES
The SMS should include procedures ensuring that non-conformities, accidents and
hazardous situations are reported to the Company, investigated and analysed with the
objective of improving safety and pollution prevention.
The Company should establish procedures for the implementation of corrective action.
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10

MAINTENANCE OF THE SHIP AND EQUIPMENT

10.1
The Company should establish procedures to ensure that the ship is maintained in
conformity with the provisions of the relevant rules and regulations and with any additional
requirements which may be established by the Company.
10.2

In meeting these requirements the Company should ensure that:
.1
inspections are held at appropriate intervals;
.2
any non-conformity is reported, with its possible cause, if known;
.3
appropriate corrective action is taken; and
.4
records of these activities are maintained.

10.3
The Company should establish procedures in its SMS to identify equipment and
technical systems the sudden operational failure of which may result in hazardous situations.
The SMS should provide for specific measures aimed at promoting the reliability of such
equipment or systems. These measures should include the regular testing of stand-by
arrangements and equipment or technical systems that are not in continuous use.
10.4
The inspections mentioned in 10.2 as well as the measures referred to in 10.3
should be integrated into the ship's operational maintenance routine.
11

DOCUMENTATION

11.1
The Company should establish and maintain procedures to control all documents
and data which are relevant to the SMS.
11.2

The Company should ensure that:
.1
valid documents are available at all relevant locations;
.2
changes to documents are reviewed and approved by authorized personnel;
and
.3

obsolete documents are promptly removed.

11.3
The documents used to describe and implement the SMS may be referred to as the
Safety Management Manual. Documentation should be kept in a form that the Company
considers most effective. Each ship should carry on board all documentation relevant to that
ship.
12

COMPANY VERIFICATION, REVIEW AND EVALUATION

12.1
The Company should carry out internal safety audits to verify whether safety and
pollution- prevention activities comply with the SMS.
12.2
The Company should periodically evaluate the efficiency of and, when needed,
review the SMS in accordance with procedures established by the Company.
12.3
The audits and possible corrective actions should be carried out in accordance with
documented procedures.
12.4
Personnel carrying out audits should be independent of the areas being audited
unless this is impracticable due to the size and the nature of the Company.
12.5
The results of the audits and reviews should be brought to the attention of all
personnel having responsibility in the area involved.
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12.6
The management personnel responsible for the area involved should take timely
corrective action on deficiencies found.
13

CERTIFICATION, VERIFICATION AND CONTROL

13.1
The ship should be operated by a Company which is issued a document of
compliance relevant to that ship.
13.2
A document of compliance should be issued for every Company complying with the
requirements of the ISM Code by the Administration, by an organization recognized by the
Administration or by the Government of the country acting on behalf of the Administration in
which the Company has chosen to conduct its business. This document should be accepted
as evidence that the Company is capable of complying with the requirements of the Code.
13.3
A copy of such a document should be placed on board in order that the master, if so
asked, may produce it for the verification of the Administration or organizations recognized
by it.
13.4
A certificate, called a Safety Management Certificate, should be issued to a ship by
the Administration or organization recognized by the Administration. The Administration
should, when issuing the certificate, verify that the Company and its shipboard management
operate in accordance with the approved SMS.
13.5
The Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration should
periodically verify the proper functioning of the ship's SMS as approved.
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Appendix 2:
Chapter IX of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1974

CHAPTER IX
Management for the safe operation of ship

Regulation 1
Definitions
For the purpose of this chapter, unless expressly provided otherwise:
1
International Safety Management (ISM) Code means the International Management
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention adopted by the
Organization by resolution A.741(18), as may be amended by the Organization, provided
that such amendments are adopted, brought into force and take effect in accordance with
the provisions of article VIII of the present Convention concerning the amendment
procedures applicable to the annex other than chapter 1.
2 Company means the owner of the ship or any other organization or person such as the
manager, or the bareboat charterer, who has assumed the responsibility for operation of the
ship from the owner of the ship and who on assuming such responsibility has agreed to take
over all the duties and responsibilities imposed by the International Safety Management
Code.
3

Oil tanker means an oil tanker as defined in regulation II-1/2.12.

4

Chemical tanker means a chemical tanker as defined in regulation VII/8.2.

5

Gas carrier means a gas carrier as defined in regulation VII/11.2.

6 Bulk carrier means a ship which is constructed generally with single
deck, top-side tanks and hopper side tanks in cargo spaces, and is intended primarily to
carry dry cargo in bulk, and includes such types as ore carriers and combination carriers.
7
Mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) means a vessel capable of engaging in drilling
operations for the exploration for or exploitation of resources beneath the sea-bed such as
liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons, sulphur or salt.
8

High-speed craft means a craft as defined in regulation X/1.2.

Regulation 2
Application
1

This chapter applies to ships, regardless of the date of construction, as follows:
.1 passenger ships including passenger high-speed craft, not later than I July 1998;
.2 oil tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers and cargo high-speed craft
of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, not later than I July 1998; and
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.3
other cargo ships and mobile offshore drilling units of 500 gross tonnage and
upwards, not later than I July 2002.
2
This chapter does not apply to government-operated ships used for non-commercial
purposes.

Regulation 3
Safety management requirements
1 The company and the ship shall comply with the requirements of the International Safety
Management Code.
2 The ship shall be operated by a company holding a Document of Compliance referred to
in Regulation 4.

Regulation 4
Certification
I
A Document of Compliance shall be issued to every company which complies with the
requirements of the International Safety Management Code. This document shall be issued
by the Administration, by an organization recognized by the Administration, or at the request
of the Administration by another Contracting Government.
2 A copy of the Document of Compliance shall be kept on board the ship in order that the
master can produce it on request for verification.
3 A Certificate, called a Safety Management Certificate, shall be issued to every ship by
the Administration or an organization recognized by the Administration. The Administration
or organization recognized by it shall, before issuing the Safety Management Certificate,
verify that the company and its shipboard management operate in accordance with the
approved safety-management system.

Regulation 5
Maintenance Of conditions
The safety-management system shag be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the
international Safety Management Code.

Regulation 6 Verification and control
1 The Administration, another Contracting Government at the request of the Administration
or an organization recognized by the Administration shall periodically verify the proper
functioning of the ship's safety- management system.
2 Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of this regulation, a ship required to hold a
certificate issued pursuant to the provisions of regulation 4.3 shad be subject to control in
accordance with the provisions of regulation XI/4. For this purpose such certificate shall be
treated as a certificate issued under regulation I/12 or I/13.
3 In cases of change of flag State or company, special transitional arrangements shall be
made in accordance with the guidelines developed by the Organization.
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